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CAUGHT IN THE TOILS OF REGULATION:
TAHOE-SIERRA, RIPENESS, PERMIT
REQUIREMENTS, AND A MEASURE OF RELIEF
Adam Greenwood*
INTRODUCTION

Toils entangle and toils net. In Dante, we hear of the "inextricable toils of death."' The First Skylark of Spring heralds the "proud, unmanumitted soul" that fights the "toils of fate's control." 2 George
Cabot Lodge speaks of "[t]he soul in the toils of the journeying
worlds."'3 Less dramatically, in modern times landowners are caught
in the toils of regulation. Regulatory toils are less sinister and inexorable than death, fate, or the motion of the worlds. Regulatory toils are
nonetheless here to stay. Though these toils put a real burden on the
property owner of complying with the rules, processes, and permit
and variance schemes of multiple local, state, and federal agencies,
the benefits to the public-and often to landowners themselves-are
no less real. The question is not one of undoing regulation wholesale
but of affording landowners various measure of relief. As land use
regulation has grown, the need for this relief has also grown. In
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional PlanningAgency,4 the
Supreme Court found that the Takings Clause of the Constitution affords just such a measure of relief to landowners by requiring their
compensation on a case-by-case basis if their land use is unduly
delayed by a particularly onerous permit requirement.
* Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2004. I would like to thank Professor
Nicole Garnett for her good offices and my wife, Sara Greenwood, for her unflagging
support.
1

DANTE ALIGHIERI.

Purgatory. THE DIVINE COMEDY. Canto XXVI, line 21 (The

Harvard Classics ed., 1909).
2

William Watson,

The First Skylark of Spring, in A VIcrO]aAN ANTHOLOGY,

1837-1895, l.21-24 (Edmund Clarence Stedman ed., 1895).
3

GEORGE CABOT LODGE, THE SONG OF THE WAVE, L 44 (1970).

4

535 U.S. 302 (2002).
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Like other areas of regulation, 5 land use regulation has expanded
in the current era. In 1916 New York City enacted the first zoning
ordinance; 6 city after city followed suit. Over time, local government
land regulations primarily concerned with nuisance and public health
became regulations at all government levels concerned with important public goods like green space, historic and aesthetic preservation,
traffic, and quality of life, 7 along with environmental land regulations
directed at preserving habitat, preserving biodiversity, and ending pollution. To take one example, in the 1970s the Endangered Species
Act 8 took the unprecedented step of prohibiting land use that involved "significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife."9 In addition to the environment and
other public goods, more doubtful goods like those of preserving
property values or neighborhood exclusiveness also found their way
into land use regulations.10 For good and for occasional ill, the toils
of land use regulation grew and continued to grow.
A good many land use regulations contained or came to contain
permits, variances, and other procedures that allowed the regulator to
flexibly adjust the regulation on a case-by-case basis. These adjustments allowed agencies to tailor regulations to the public good in specific situations and were often less harsh on landowners than blanket
prohibitions. To continue the previous example, in 1982 Congress
added permit language to the Endangered Species Act, allowing permits in cases of incidental habitat destruction, where the landowner
did everything possible to reduce the harm and the Environmental
5 Crudely, but effectively, we are told that "The Federal Register, the annual
compilation of new regulations, climbed from 12,000 pages in 1950 to 70,000 pages in
1993 and may reach 90,000 in 1995." H.R. REP. No. 104-120, at 64 (1995), cited in
William M. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89
IOWA L. REV. 1, 64 (2003). I have not been able to locate an equivalent statistical
measure for land use regulation alone.

6

ANDERSON'S AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING

§ 3.07 (K. Young rev. 4th ed. 1996).

7 See, e.g., John R. Nolon, Golden and its Emanations: The Surprising Origins of Smart
Growth,. 35 URB. LAW. 15, 16 (2003) (chronicling "three decades of experimentation
and creativity responsible for a plethora of techniques now available to fight sprawl:
the toolbox practitioners use to achieve smart growth at the local level").
8 Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 844 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000)).
9 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S.
687, 691 (1995) (accepting the Environmental Protection Agency's interpretation of
16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(19), 1536(a)(2) (2000)).
10 Henry A. Span, How the Courts Should Fight Exclusionary Zoning, 32 SETON HALL
L. REV. 1, 8-22 (2001) (describing how municipalities can use density restrictions,
excess commercially and agriculturally zoned areas, and restrictions on multi-family
housing to maintiain property values and keep out the poor).
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Protection Agency (EPA) felt the endangered species was not at risk.1 '
This permit flexibility allowed the EPA to better preserve endangered
species in a number of cases. When a San Bruno Mountain development threatened the Mission Blue butterfly, for example, the EPA was
able to grant a permit that committed the landowners to leaving fourfifths of the property in open space and to spending $60,000 a year on
habitat improvement. 12 Permit and variance schemes gave governments and agencies the flexibility to fine tune regulations and enhance the public good while holding out some promise of relief to
landowners.
This promise was not always met. Although they appeared to relax otherwise harsh regulations, permits and other escape hatches
made harsh regulations possible, created unpredictability and uncertainty, gave government entities enormous power to string out and
delay, gave these same entities the ability to extract conditions and
concessions, and in all these things thereby shift the burden of achieving a public goal to a private person. Variances and permits fine
tuned regulation at great private cost through repeated delays, repeated applications, and an enormous burden of fact development.
Far from providing a measure of relief from the regulatory toils, permits and variances sometimes added to it.
The courts had already evolved a regulatory takings jurisprudence that compensated landowners when the costs of the regulatory
toils grew too great. A similar approach to permit requirements that
provided compensation in the worst cases of private landowner burden would similarly appear to ease the burden on landowners without
undoing the public good that permit requirements serve. Happily,
permits and variance already fit well into the regulatory takings framework-one needed only conceive of the permit requirement as a regulation temporarily "taking" the right to use the land in a particular
way, ending at the date of the granting of the permit.
Nonetheless, four legal obstacles stood in the way of this happy
resolution. First, the courts had to recognize that a temporary regulatory taking could be a taking. Second, the courts had to recognize that
permits and variances were in themselves regulations on land use.
Third, the courts had to overcome artificial ripeness barriers that prevented litigation until agencies had made a formal "final decision," a
decision that often never came. The courts did indeed overcome
these obstacles and this Note will limn how it was done. Fourth, the
courts had to overcome artificial ripeness rules which held that a tak11 ESA § 10, 16 U.S.C. §1539.
12

See Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 980 (1985).
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ings challenge to a permit requirement could never be ripe if a permit
had been granted. The Supreme Court overcame this fourth barrier
in Tahoe-Sierraand affirmed with an unprecedented clarity that permit
requirements could be regulatory takings. Although landowners will
still not always, or even usually, prevail on their takings claims, TahoeSierra removes the barriers that threw out most claims on summary
judgment. Claims can now go to trial and sometimes prevail. The
Constitution has afforded a measure of relief to those who find themselves caught in the toils of permit regulation.
Part I of this Note will lay out general regulatory takings principles. Part II will discuss the first two obstacles to treating permit requirements as potential regulatory takings and the clearing of these
obstacles. Part III will explore the unique ripeness jurisprudence appropriate to regulatory takings. Part IV will discuss the third obstacle,
created by that jurisprudence-the formal "final decision" rulebefore explaining how that obstacle was overcome. Part V will consider in depth the fourth obstacle, also created by that unique ripeness jurisprudence: a substantive ripeness rule that a permit
requirement could never be a taking. In turn, Part VI will come to
Tahoe-Sierra,which removed all basis for that fourth obstacle and ultimately stated clearly what before had only been implied: that permit
requirements and other planning devices could be regulatory takings.
I.

THE GENERAL FRAMEwORK OF REGULATORY TAKINGS

As regulations grew, the Supreme Court started to treat the occasional land use regulation as a possible taking. Although the regulatory takings doctrine was never so severe as to actually hinder
regulation, it did provide a measure of relief.
Justice Holmes wrote the first opinion that treated a regulation,
13
as opposed to outright physical occupation or ouster, as a taking.
The opinion involved the Pennsylvania Coal Company, which had specifically reserved the support rights in its sale of several surface
properties, allowing the company to mine even the coal that kept the
surface from subsiding. A Pennsylvania act later prohibited using support rights in ways that subsided the surface underneath a dwelling,
14
and the surface owners sued for injunctive relief.
Justice Holmes, writing for the eight to one majority, held that
some regulations could so impede property rights that they constituted a taking. The opinion set up several key concepts. First, it held
that not all regulation of property rights constituted a taking, saying
13
14

Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
Id. at 412-13.
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that "[g] overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every
such change in the general law."' 15 Second, as already stated, the opinion held that a regulation could effect a taking if the "regulation goes
too far." 16 Finally, Holmes stated that an "an average reciprocity of
advantage" might excuse an otherwise overreaching regulation.1 7 The
.first two principles seemed to set up a balancing test, although what
was to be balanced remained unclear. The third seemed to suggest
that regulations only infringed property rights in the case of some mismatch between the bearer of the burden and the object of the benefit.
While these key concepts cried out for further elaboration, they
did not conceptually differentiate permits and other planning regulations from the general run of land use restrictions. Some permits
could conceivably impose such severe burdens on property owners,
while benefiting parties other than the burdened owners, that a taking
might occur. Permit requirements seemed weighable in the same balancing test as other regulations, whatever that balancing test may have
been. Even so, the Supreme Court had not explicitly addressed permit requirements as regulatory takings.
In the immediately subsequent decades the Court was not able to
clarify the implied balancing test of regulatory takings. The Court admitted that "whether a particular government restriction amounted to
a constitutional taking ...turn [ed] upon the particular circumstances
of each case."18 The Court did take one important doctrinal step. It
explained the rationale behind takings jurisprudence: it "was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole."1 9 This rationale did not appear to exclude
permit regulations. Some permit requirements, at least, could shift
public burdens to private parties. For example, consider provisions of
the Endangered Species Act referred to in the Introduction. Landowners are prevented from certain land uses that harm species until
they agree to alter their land use in a way that moderates the harm,
and until they help develop the factual record on the extent and location of the endangered species and the way it will suffer from the proposed land uses. 20 The resulting biodiversity benefits us all. The
delay and information costs burden only the landowner.
15

Id. at 413.

16
17
18

Id. at 415.
Id.
United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958).

19

Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).

20

See supra notes 8-9, 11.
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The modern era of regulatory takings law began in 1978 with
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York. 21 Penn Central involved a suit between the owners of the historic Grand Central Station
and the City of New York. The owners planned to add an edifice to
the existing structure, and the city prohibited the contemplated use
on preservation grounds. 22 Justice Brennan, writing for the Court,
found that the prohibition on new construction had not gone too
23
far.
Penn Central mattered and matters because it suggested some discrete factors that go into the balancing test implied in Pennsylvania
Coal. It identified as one factor the "economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations."24 In an
apparent restatement of this factor, the court referred to "interests
that were sufficiently bound up with the reasonable expectations of the
25
claimant to constitute 'property' for Fifth Amendment purposes."
As another factor, the opinion identified "the character of the governmental action," 26 apparently including the extent to which "health,
safety, morals, or general welfare" 27 were involved in the government
action. The Court emphasized that it was engaged in "essentially ad
28
hoc, factual inquiries."
Of these factors, the most significant is probably that of "investment-backed expectations." "Investment-backed expectations," or its
equivalent, "reasonable expectations," may refer to a famous article by
Frank Michelman that urged redefining regulatory takings along similar lines for utilitarian reasons. 29 In the alternative, it may refer to a
book by Bruce Ackerman, published the year before the decision,
21

438 U.S. 104 (1978).

22 See id. at 108-19.
23 Id. at 138.
24 Id. at 124 (emphasis added).
25 Id. at 125 (emphasis added).
26 Id. at 124.
27 Id. at 125 (citing Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928)).
28 Id. at 124.
29 See, e.g., Carol Necole Brown, Taking the Takings Claim: A Policy and Economic
Analysis of the Survival of Takings Claims After Property Transfers, 36 CONN. L. REV. 7, 21
n.87 (2003) ("Professor Frank I. Michelman is widely credited with first articulating
the concept of 'investment-backed expectations.'"). In his famous article Property,
Utility, and Fairness, Michelman refers to reasonable expectations numerous times.
See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the EthicalFoundations of 'just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1212 (1967). He does so
because, in his utilitarian approach, the more a land use is part of an owner's expectations for the land, the greater the social costs of taking it away from him. Id. at 1231.
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which advocated rethinking takings law in the light of a layman's (and
30
ordinary observer's) understanding of what constitutes property.
Neither author distinguished between permits and other land use
regulations.
Neither did the Penn Central decision itself. And while the Penn
Central factors have resisted further definition, the case has captured
the judicial imagination to such an extent that the regulatory takings
balancing test is usually called the Penn Central test, although some31

times it is referred to as the ad hoc test because of its uncertainties.
The Penn Centraltest has received little elaboration since the decision itself. The Supreme Court reaffirmed recently that the Penn Central test is still an "ad hoc, factual inquir[y] ''3 2 that allows the
"weighing of all the relevant circumstances."3 3 What elaboration it
has received has done nothing to exclude permits. For example, in
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,34 the Supreme Court clarified
that a complete and permanent ban on property use would always
effect a regulatory taking.3 5 This became known as the categorical or
per se test.36 Lucas had no effect on permits and other less-than-complete takings, leaving them to the Penn Central test.
The Penn Centraltest, then, is still the mainstay of our regulatory
takings jurisprudence. It conceptually applies to permit regulations as
well as other types. The balancing factors of investment-backed expectations and of the governmental interest are both affected even by
a mere requirement that a landowner seek a permit. The delay and
expense occasioned by permit-seeking might interfere with the value
of a property, and the clear purposes for which the landowner has
bought it. Alternatively, if the governmental interest in requiring the
permit-seeking is slight, but the burden of getting the permit is high,
perhaps a taking might lie. Most permit requirements probably would
not constitute a taking in the end-as indeed most other land use
30 See generally
(1977).

BRUCE

AcK,ERMAN,

PRIVATE

PROPERTY

AND

THE

CONSTITUTION

31 See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1697 (1988).
32 Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
535 U.S. 302, 322 (2002) (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124).
33 Id. (citing Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
34 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
35 "[W] hen the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking." Id. at 1019.
36 Tahoe-Sierra,535 U.S. at 325.
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regulations do not in the end 37 -but the Penn Central test does not
appear to exclude them ex ante. An ad hoc inquiry into land regulation is, by nature, fact-specific. It does not lend itself to the categorical exclusion of any one class of land use regulation. The general
principles of Penn Centralshould apply to permit requirements just as
much as to other land use regulations.
Still, applicability of general principles is not the same as cases
specifically addressing permit requirements as potential takings. Even
given Penn Central, the courts could have evolved a formal or even
arbitrary distinction between permit requirements and other land use
regulations. In fact, the Court had to overcome several such formalizing and arbitrary tendencies among the lower courts.
Its own early decision, Agins v. Tiburon,3 8 was unintentionally one
source of such formalizing tendencies. Agins in part involved landowners who had held off on a development while the City of Tiburon
tried to condemn their property. The city later dropped its efforts to
condemn, but by then the development value had dropped considerably. The landowners sued for a taking. The Court noted that "[m] ere
fluctuations in value during the process of governmental decisionmaking, absent extraordinary delay, are 'incidents of ownership. They cannot be considered as a "taking" in the constitutional sense.' "39 This
passage is best read, emphasizing the phrase "fluctuations in value," to
indicate that changes in property value are not equivalent to prohibitions of property use. While the government must sometimes pay for
the value of property uses that it takes to itself, and if the taking is
temporary then the rental value, it does not have to pay for swings in
the market, no more than a tenant has to compensate his landlord if
property values drop during his lease. This interpretation of Agins is
the best interpretation, but is not the only one; some took the Court
to mean that "governmental decisionmaking" cast a protective sphere
over land use regulations in aid of that decisionmaking, i.e., permit
requirements.

40

37 See, e.g., David F. Coursen, The TakingsJurisprudenceof the Court of FederalClaims
and the Federal Circuit, 29 ErrL. L. 821, 823 (1999) (noting that "the Court ...has
generally rejected the takings claim" when using the Penn Central test); Alexander
Volokh, Comment, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002), 116 HAIv. L. REv. 321, 331 (2002) ("... Penn
Central is unsympathetic to landowner claimants.").
38 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
39 Id. at 263 n.9 (quoting Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 285 (1939))
(upholding a pre-condemnation valuation agreed to by Danforth and the United
States in anticipation of condemnation instead of the lower actual value of the land at
the time of condemnation).
40 See infra Part V.B.
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The landowners in Agins also claimed a taking based on new zoning the city put in place when it dropped its condemnation suit. As
the zoning regulations still permitted the landowners to build up to
five houses, the Court rejected this claim: land use regulations "took,"
the Court said, if they "denie [d] an owner economically viable use of
his land."4 ' That language had two possible meanings. In the first, a
regulation automatically became a taking if it denied all economic use.
Because of some ripeness concerns the Agins Court raised, 42 this first
meaning is probably the best. The second meaning, by no means implausible, is that a regulation only became a taking if it denied all economic use. This second meaning would surely exclude permit
requirements from takings since future economic uses are still uses.
By suggesting that a partial regulation of land use would not constitute a regulatory taking, Agins implied that a temporary regulation of
land use (by definition partial), and therefore permit requirements,
could not be regulatory takings. Agins raised questions about temporary land use regulation, and about the special status of decisionmaking processes, that regulatory takings jurisprudence would have to
answer before that jurisprudence could apply to permits.
Agins was not the only sources of obstacles to the application of
regulatory takings jurisprudence to permit requirements. In addition,
some lower courts misunderstood the Supreme Court ripeness rules
for regulatory takings. First, these courts reconceived the "final decision" requirements of ripeness as a formal rule. 43 This meant that
governments and agencies could avoid any takings consideration of
their permit requirements if they kept postponing a "final decision"
by repeatedly asking for new permit applications. Second, some lower
courts interpreted ripeness as a substantive rule of decision that somehow barred any claims involving granted permits. Agencies and governments could avoid any takings consideration of their permit
requirements by granting a permit. Regulatory takings jurisprudence
would have to overturn these mistakes before it could afford landowners a measure of relief from permit requirements.
II.

TEMPORARY TAKINGS AND PERMITS AS POTENTIAL TAKINGS

In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court began to clarify the
role of permits in regulatory takings. The decisions established that a
temporary ban on use could indeed be a taking. By treating some
disproportionate exactions on which permits were conditioned as tak41
42
43

Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
See infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
See infra Part W.A.
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ings, the Supreme Court also moved toward affirming the view that
permits were as much regulations as any other land use restriction
and did not have some special decisionmaking or process status.
A.

Temporary Takings

For a time after Penn Central, the Supreme Court had yet to recognize a temporary use restriction as a taking, let alone a permit. The
court's balancing test-public interest versus private burden-appeared to include temporary restrictions as well as permanent ones,
but some judicial authority had to pull the trigger. Until then, agencies could evade takings challenges by repealing the restriction, making it temporary. Consequently, plaintiffs could not seek
compensation for a granted permit, no matter the delay, expense, and
conditions attached to it, because the granting of the permit made the
regulation temporary.
Then, in a 1987 case, the Supreme Court first ruled that temporary use regulations could be regulatory takings. Although First En44
glish Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles

specifically put permits and other planning delays to one side, 45 the
Court's reasoning cleared the way for permit requirements to present
valid takings claims, analyzed under Penn Central.
In First English, the plaintiff Lutheran church owned a camp destroyed by flood. The County of Los Angeles responded to the flood
by forbidding any new construction or any reconstruction in a flood
protection area defined to include the camp. 46 When the church
claimed a taking, the county maintained the ordinance pending the
results of state litigation; when California courts ruled for the church,
the county withdrew the restrictive ordinance. The California courts
then ruled that the taking had vanished: the county had to pay compensation only if it chose to maintain the restriction after the matter
had worked its way through the courts, on the grounds that a government should never have to pay compensation unless it voluntarily
chose to continue a regulation while understanding that compensation would lie. 47 The Supreme Court thus faced the following issue:
may a landowner collect damages for regulatory deprivations that happened before a final court ruling certifying that the regulation was
indeed a taking? 48 As the regulatory body had withdrawn the regula44
45
46
47
48

482 U.S. 304 (1987).
See id. at 321.
Id. at 307.
Id. at 308-10.
See id. at 306-07.

TOILS OF

2004]

REGULATION

2089

tion as soon as it was deemed a taking, the Court presented the quesrequire
tion this way: can the Takings Clause sometimes
49
compensation for mere "'temporary' regulatory takings?"
The Court concluded that temporary deprivations could in fact
be takings, depending on the outcome of the Penn Central analysis,
and that temporariness did not per se preclude a taking. As the Court
stated, "'temporary' takings which, as here, deny a landowner all use
50
of his property, are not different in kind from permanent takings.
In addition, the Court made clear that nothing distinguished pre-trial
usage bans from those that occurred post-trial. The county's desire to
receive a court ruling before lifting the ban was no different from the
other legitimate government motives that could also effect takings
under Penn Central, as the Court noted: "We merely hold that where
the government's activities have already worked a taking of all use of
property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of
the duty to provide compensation for the period during which the
taking was effective." 51 Regulations on land use were still potentially
takings under Penn Central, regardless whether they were temporary,
and whether they were tied up in a judicial proceeding.
Although FirstEnglish was not about a permit or other temporary
planning ban, its ruling and reasoning broke down important barriers. Temporariness mattered because permits always temporarily deprive owners of some land use. The refusal to let the county "lift" the
taking mattered because agencies "lift" permit deprivations by granting permits. Such lifting does not, of course, change the reality of
past prohibitions. The Court's indifference to the presence of an
ongoing judicial process during the time of the temporary ban mattered because permit regulations temporarily ban uses precisely to facilitate the ongoing quasi-judicial process that leads to permit
approval. Indeed, if the analogies were not so close, the Court would
not have had to exempt permits from the scope of the ruling. The
stage was set for the first forays into permit requirements and then
Tahoe-Sierra's definitive ruling.
B.

Permit Exactions as Takings

The first actual foray into permit requirements occurred the
same year as First English. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission52 involved a permit to build a beach house. The Commission granted the
49
50
51
52

Id. at 313.
Id. at 318.
Id. at 321.
483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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permit, or would have if the Nollans had acquiesced in granting an
easement to the public to cross their beach. 53 The Court ignored any
uncertainties about permits as takings. Instead, the Court granted the
Nollans compensation in the event the Commission continued to insist on an easement. 54 Why? Because the condition on the permitthe easement-was not sufficiently related to the original purpose of
the regulation that restricted building. In the Court's language, it
55
lacked a "nexus" and therefore was a regulatory taking.
Crucially, the Nollan Court decided to characterize the exaction
as a taking and not as a due process violation. 56 Here was the first hint
that the Constitution would reject a conception of permits that would
treat them as mere procedures and not as land use regulations.
In Dolan v. City of Tigard,57 the Supreme Court again refused to
throw out a case on the grounds that a permit had been granted or
the challenged land use regulation was part and parcel of the decisionmaking process. Florence Dolan, an electric supplies and plumbing vendor, applied to the city of Tigard for a permit to rebuild her
facility. They granted it, on condition she set aside some green space
for flood control (she planned to pave more parking lot) and land for
a bike path (her larger facility would attract more customers).58 Although Ms. Dolan received a permit, she did not much like these conditions on it, so she took to the courts and made it all the way to the
top.
The Supreme Court found that the city of Tigard was not simply
trying to "obtain an easement through gimmickry,"59 as the California
Coastal Commission had. Instead, the city had simply not tailored
53
54
55

Id. at 828.
Id. at 841-42.
Id. at 837.

56 Id. at 834 n.3. Note thatJustice Brennan dissented because he preferred a due
process analysis. Id. at 843 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Nollan is another example
of the odd interaction between the Due Process Clause and the Takings Clause, although Nollan rejects an attempt to conflate the two. Although much can and will be
said about this interaction, see Steven J. Eagle, Substantive Due Process and Regulatory
Takings: A Reappraisal 51 ALA. L. REV. 977 (2000);John D. Echeverria & Sharon Dennis, The Takings Issue and the Due Process Clause:A Way Out of DoctrinalConfusion, 17 VT.
L. REV. 695 (1993); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., ExpropriatoryIntent: Defining the Proper
Boundaries of SubstantiveDue Process and the Takings Clause, 80 N.C. L. REV. 713 (2002);
Roderick E. Walston, The Constitution and Property: Due Process, Regulatory Takings, and
Judicial Takings, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 379, it is not the subject of this Note. It suffices

that Nollan chose to treat the exaction as a takings violation.
57 512 U.S. 374 (1994)
58 Id. at 379-80.
59 Id. at 387.
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their request to fit the damage Ms. Dolan's new store might cause.
The conditions did not seem to be in "rough proportionality" to the
needs that had inspired the permit regulations in the first place. 6°1
The Supreme Court remanded, with the instruction that the city of
Tigard must prove rough proportionality or compensate Ms. Dolan. 6'
Dolan, which extends Nollan, bears the same relation to permits
and takings as does the latter case. It shows that granted permits
ought not per se exclude owners from the courts, and, by holding that
conditions not in "rough proportionality" are per se compensable,
leaves room for the more ordinary delays and conditions associated
with permits to be considered under the ad hoc Penn Centraltest. The
Nollan/Dolan per se rule, let it be noted, also directly undermines
62
lower court cases barring permit requirements on ripeness grounds.
While this Note argues, and Tahoe-Sierra confirms, that the ordinary
delays inherent in a permit scheme are potential takings under Penn
Central, these lower court cases refuse to hear Penn Central permit
claims except in cases of "extraordinary delay. ' 63 These cases define
"extraordinary delay" as that delay exceeding what is justified by the
purposes of the regulatory scheme. 6 4 But, Nollan and Dolan in a sense
hold that permit requirement burdens not justified by the government's purposes are always takings. The lower court cases, on the
other hand, grudgingly treat these extra costs only as potential takings
under a Penn Centraltest, and refuse to consider any other costs at all.
The Nollan and Dolan framework set the stage for evaluating ordinary
permit requirements under the Penn Central test.
III.

RIPENESS AND REGULATORY TAKINGS

This Note has detailed the slow movement of the Supreme Court
toward treating permits as potential regulatory takings. This movement would excite no remark-permits would not separate themselves from other sorts of regulations-were it not for two factors.
First, until FirstEnglish the possibility was still open of a formal distinction between permanent land use regulations and temporary ones,
and until Nollan and Dolan the possibility was still open that permit
requirements had a special status as part of a decisionmaking process.
Second, a unique ripeness jurisprudence, involving permits, had
60
61
62
63
64

Id. at 391.
Id. at 395.
These cases are discussed infra Part V.B.
See infra note 126-27 and accompanying text.
See Wyatt v. United States, 271 F.3d 1090, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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grown up for regulatory takings. This jurisprudence created some
confusion about the status of permits as takings claims.
A.

General Ripeness Doctrine

Ripeness doctrine concerns "whether [a] case involves uncertain
or contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all." 65 The ripeness doctrine arose from a

blend of prudential and constitutional concerns. Prudentially, courts
wished to make decisions based on a fully developed factual record,
not on hypothetical or speculative facts. Constitutionally, federal
courts could not issue advisory opinions66-statements of law not tied
to any concrete "case or controversy. "67
The ripeness doctrine came into its strength in the area of administrative law, agencies, and regulations, especially where the agency
has a procedure, such as a permit, that allows the agency to individualize the application of a regulation. Courts will often refuse to hear
challenges to regulations until the parties have settled on the individual application. Ripeness in regulatory disputes wards the courts
against "entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies." 68 It also "protect[s] the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its
effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties." 69 In essence,
the courts will not allow wholesale challenges to regulations unless the
challengers have taken advantage of any permits, variances, administrative reviews, or other devices that might change the way the regulation applies. 70 Ripeness allows the courts to steer clear of the fighting
until they can tell what the fighting is about.
65 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3532,
at 112 (1984); see also Maria E. Mansfield, Standing and Ripeness Revisited: The Supreme
Court's "Hypothetical"Barriers,68 N.D. L. Rev. 1, 68 (1992) ("most courts would rather
avoid speculative cases, defer to finders of fact with greater subject matter expertise,
decide cases with fully-developed records, and avoid overly broad opinions, even if
these courts might constitutionally hear a dispute."), Gregory M. Stein, Regulatory Takings and Ripeness in the Federal Courts, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1, 11 (1995); Gene R. Nichol,
Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 178 (1987) (stating that "ripeness.., allows courts to postpone interfering when necessary so that other branches
of government ...may perform their functions unimpeded").
66 See RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 92-95 (4th ed. 1996).
67 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
68 Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967), rev'd on other
grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
69 Id.
70 13A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 65, § 3532.6, at 193-95.
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As regulatory takings claims by definition involve regulations,
ripeness doctrine would seem to come into play in some form. And
because the Penn Central test is so fact-specific, ripeness would seem
even more crucial to ward off claims until landowners and agencies
had reached some sort of final agreement. Ripeness would thus appear to require that a landowner not challenge a regulation until the
landowner had tried his hand at obtaining a permit. If the permit was
granted, some prohibitions on land use would end and the facts of the
claim would differ. Likewise, if a landowner wished to challenge the
permit requirement itself-the mere refusal to allow property use
without permission-the landowner would still have to seek a permit.
Until the permit was granted, the courts would not otherwise know
what delay and land use conditions the permit requirement imposed
on that particular landowner's use of the property.
B.

The Unique Regulatory Takings Ripeness Doctrine

The application of ripeness concerns in regulatory takings was no
less obvious to the Supreme Court. An off-hand reference in Penn
Central first indicated the potential intersection of permits, ripeness,
and regulatory takings. The New York City law in question allowed
exceptions to the development ban upon obtaining a "certificate," essentially a permit.7 1 The Penn Central Company had applied for an
ambitious certificate, and been denied. 72 As a side note, the Supreme
Court noted that the applicants could have submitted a more reasonable development request, but did not. 73 Many have seen this state-

ment as the first suggestion of the peculiar importance ripeness
concerns would come to have in the regulatory takings area-that is,
the first suggestion of the importance of ripeness in takings challenges
to regulations that contained permit provisions or other possible
waivers.74
Ripeness in regulatory takings cases soon developed beyond the
fleeting reference in Penn Central. The first significant ripeness discussion occurred in Agins v. City of Tiburon.75 In that case, the landown71 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 112 (1978).
72 Id. at 116-17.
73 Id. at 118-19 ("[A]ppellants did not avail themselves of the opportunity to
develop and submit other plans for the Commission's consideration and approval.");
id. at 137 n.34 ("Counsel for appellants admitted at oral argument that the Commission has not suggested that it would not, for example, approve a 20-story office tower
along the lines of that which was part of the original plan for the Terminal.").
74 See, e.g., Patrick W. Maraist, A Statutory Beacon in the Land Use Ripeness Maze: The
FloridaPrivate Property Rights ProtectionAct, 47 FLA. L. Rv. 411, 422 (1995).
75 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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ers purchased a five-acre lot. Subsequently, Tiburon imposed zoning
restrictions that would have permitted, if permission was applied for,
one to five single-family homes. Instead of applying for approval, the
landowners claimed a regulatory taking, but the court rejected their
claim on grounds of unripeness, among others.7 6 Because the landowners had failed to seek a permit and thereby develop a specific record, the Supreme Court only considered whether the mere
enactment of a zoning regulation worked a taking. 77 The presence of
a permit requirement in the case proved significant.
Above all, Williamson County Regional PlanningCommission v. Hamilton Bank ofJohnson City78 crystallized ripeness as a unique takings concern. After Hamilton Bank foreclosed on an undeveloped plot in
Williamson County, Tennessee, it submitted a proposed subdivision
for county permit approval. A similar proposal for the land had already received approval under prior zoning regulations. The county
79
disapproved this proposal, citing excess density and other factors,
and the bank sued. Although the Supreme Court eventually granted
certiorari, it dismissed the bank's claim. The Court ruled that landowners must seek permits or variances or waivers before their takings
claim could ripen. It stated that "a claim that the application of government regulations effects a taking of a property interest is not ripe
until the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue." 0 The Court held that, even though
the county had turned down the proposed subdivision, the takings
claim was not ripe because Hamilton Bank had not availed themselves
of the variance procedure, in addition to their permit application.,'
In addition, the Court seemed to hold that landowners must first seek
compensation in the state courts. 82 As in general regulatory ripeness
cases, landowners had to seek a final decision. Regulatory takings
seemed to add the additional wrinkle that a final decision might require multiple efforts. In any takings claim against a permit regulation, ripeness would now be a central dispute.
Later cases fleshed out the rationale for regulatory takings ripeness.

MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County,8 3 like Williamson

76

Id. at 260.

77

Id.

78

473 U.S. 172 (1985).

79
80
81
82
83

Id. at 181-82.
Id. at 186-87.
Id. at 187-94.
Id. at 194.
477 U.S. 340 (1986).
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County, involved frustrated developers whose proposed subdivision
had been denied. As in Williamson County, the Court turned down the
developers' claim because it thought that the county might have permitted some other form of use. Thus, no final decision had been
reached. In applying the Williamson County rule to reach the Williamson County result, the Supreme Court explained the rationale for that
rule: an "essential prerequisite to [asserting a regulatory takings
claim] is a final and authoritative determination of the type and intensity of development legally permitted on the subject property. A court
cannot determine whether a regulation has gone 'too far' unless it
84
knows how far the regulation goes."

In other words, the takings ripeness rationale is that of the ripeness doctrine at large. The court cannot reasonably balance the public interest against the private harm until it knows exactly the extent of
the private harm. As one would expect, ripeness allows the court to
know exactly what is at stake in each in case.
IV.

THE FIRST ABUSE OF REGULATORY TAKINGS RIPENESS:
THE "FINAL DECISION" RULE

Regrettably, the principle of regulatory takings ripeness has done
more than clarify the private harm-it has reduced property owners'
ability to escape from the toils of regulation. The multiple permit attempts required to reach a final decision, and the further requirement of bringing suit in the state courts first, heavily burden
landowners.
A.

The Formal 'Tinal Decision" Rule

Compounding the problem, lower federal courts often treated
the final decision requirement as a formal and not a functional requirement. Even in cases where an agency repeatedly denied various
requests, courts formalistically refused to consider claims if the agency
85
held out hope for next time.
Some commentators even suggest that the Supreme Court itself
initially applied the final decision requirement formalistically. 8 6 In
any case, most regulated landowners faced a situation where they
would have to pass through unending decisionmaking procedures in
84 Id. at 348.
85 SeeJohnJ. Delaney & Duane J. Desiderio, Who Will Clean Up the "Ripeness Mess"?
A Callfor Reform so Takings Plaintiffs Can Enter the FederalCourthouse, 31 URB. LAw. 195,
202-36 (1999) (collecting cases). But see R. Jeffrey Lyman, Finality Ripeness in Federal
Land Use Cases from Hamilton Bank to Lucas, 9J. LAND USE & ENVrL. L. 101 (1993).
86 See Stein, supra note 65, at 14-27.
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order to get a ripe claim. And even good faith efforts to abide by the
formal ripeness requirements were often unavailing because the

87
mandatory trip through the state courts precluded a federal claim.

City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.,88 illustrates the
pernicious way that these formalistic ripeness requirements acted to
worsen the state of landowners caught in the regulatory toils, instead
of affording them a measure of relief. In 1981 Del Monte Dunes submitted a modest development proposal, some 344 houses for an area
zoned for up to 1000.89 Monterey's planning board denied approval

but suggested that a 264 house development would receive it. Del
Monte Dunes applied for a 264 house development; the planning
board denied approval but suggested 224. Del Monte Dunes applied
again for the lower amount and the planning board again denied approval, suggesting a lower amount. Formally speaking, Del Monte
Dunes did not have a ripe claim because it did not yet have a final
rejection. Del Monte Dunes then appealed to the city council, which
suggested a 190 unit development, but the planning commission
again denied a permit. Del Monte Dunes again appealed to the city
council, which demanded a list of exactions and concessions. Del
Monte Dunes complied and made another application. At least one
body approved-the architecture commission-but the planning
commission still denied a permit. At the same time another agency
declared a sewer moratorium that applied to all new development.
The city council refused any further help to Del Monte Dunes at this
point. When Del Monte Dunes finally sued for compensation, the district court rejected the suit as unripe, because Del Monte Dunes had
not yet received "a definitive decision as to the development the city
would allow." 90 The district court's action was typical of those lower
courts that treated the final decision requirement as a formal rule.
B.

The Demise of the Formal "FinalDecision" Rule

Although the lower courts have not always been quick to respond, 9 1 subsequent Supreme Court cases, returning to the purposes
of takings ripeness, made it clear that variances, permits, and other
devices were only required for ripeness if they had some chance of
87 Michael M. Berger, Supreme Bait and Switch: The Ripeness Ruse in Regulatoy Takings, 3 WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y 99, 105-20 (2000); Delaney & Desiderio, supra note 85,
at 195, 202-32 (1999).

88

526 U.S. 687 (1999).

89
90
91

See id. at 695-98.
Id. at 698.
See Delaney and Desiderio, supra note 85.
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being granted. As the Court said in 1997, a suit could proceed even
without a "final decision": " [b] ecause the agency has no discretion to
exercise.... no occasion exists for applying [the] requirement that a
landowner take steps to obtain a final decision." 92 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council is another recent instance where the Court let an
individual sue without formally seeking a variance or a final decision,
in this case because the original regulation admitted no exceptions.9 3
Lucas also allowed the landowner to continue with his claim even
though the South Carolina legislature had added a permit procedure
in the middle of the litigation. 94 Both of these rulings indicated that
ripeness in regulatory takings was meant only to clarify the application
of a regulation. It was not meant as a formal barrier to litigation.
In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,95 decided recently, the Court addressed itself almost entirely to the issue of ripeness and finality. Mr.
Palazzolo owned eighteen acres of coastal wetlands, which he wished
to fill in and start developing. When Rhode Island Coastal Resources
Management Council turned down both his requests, he sued, claiming a regulatory taking. 96 The Court first dismissed the claim that the
alleged takings was unripe because other regulatory agencies had also
imposed permit requirements on Palazzolo's land, and Palazzolo had
not sought permits from those agencies after the Council turned him
down. 9 7 It then addressed the assertion that the central claim was unripe, as Palazzolo had not yet exhausted his possibilities of permits,
variances, exceptions, or other devices. The Supreme Court affirmed
that "[w] hile a landowner must give a land-use authority an opportunity to exercise its discretion, once it becomes clear that the agency
lacks the discretion to permit any development, or the permissible
uses of the property are known to a reasonable degree of certainty, a
takings claim is likely to have ripened." 9 8 Although Palazzolo had only
filed two applications, both of them for optimistic amounts of development, 99 the agency had rejected his applications on the grounds
92 Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 739 (1997).
93 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1008-09, 1012-13
(1992).
94 Id. at 1010-11; Stein, supra note 65, at 24.
95 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
96 Id. at 606.
97 Id. at 624. Apparently Mr. Palazzolo would have needed a zoning variance
from the city of Waverly and a sewage permit from the Rhode Island Department of
Environmental Management even if the Council had approved his application to fill
in the wetlands. Id.
98 Id. at 620.
99 Id. at 614-15.
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that they did not serve a "compelling public purpose." 10 0 The Supreme Court felt a reasonable certainty that Palazzolo would never
reach this standard, no matter how many permits he requested or variances he sought. 0 1 The Court ended with MacDonald's classic explanation of the takings ripeness doctrine: "[a] court cannot determine
whether a regulation goes 'too far' unless it knows how far the regulation goes." 10 2 The Court then immediately added that "[r]ipeness
doctrine does not require a landowner to submit applications for their
own sake."10 3 In explicit terms Palazzolo put an end to any idea that
the "final decision" rule is a formal rule. Instead, Palazzolo reaffirmed
04
ripeness in regulatory takings as a functional doctrine.
Palazzolo and other decisions made it clear that regulatory takings
ripeness is not a formal doctrine requiring a completed attempt to get
a permit or a waiver in every case. Rather, in most cases the landowner must seek a permit or a variance because only once the permit
is granted or denied can one know the extent of the regulation. The
ripeness doctrine question exists to give courts something to judge:
What has been taken? What exactly does the regulation deny? Especially now that recent decisions have corrected some of the abuses of
the ripeness doctrine, this prudence and discretion can only be applauded. This solid, practical doctrine gives the court the case-specific
facts that Penn Central requires.
V.

THE FOURTH OBSTACLE: RIPENESS AS A

FoRmAL

RULE FORBIDDING

CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AGAINST PERMIT REQUIREMENTS

In addition to making the final decision requirement a formal
requirement, some courts have unfortunately viewed the ripeness doctrine as a rule of decision rather than as a rule for fact development,

at least when it comes to permit requirements. These courts have
held that granting a permit wipes away not only some sorts of takings
claims but all possible takings claims. Thus, if after a long process the
landowner successfully gets a permit, these courts think that the landowner isper se denied any takings claim against regulation requiring
him to undergo a lengthy approval process.
100 Id. at 615.
101 Id. at 620.
102 Id. at 622 (citing MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340,
348 (1986)).
103 Id.
104 For an excellent discussion, see William M. Hof, Note, Trying to Halt the Procedural Merry-Go-Round: The Ripeness of Regulatory Takings After Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,
46 ST. Louis U. LJ. 833 (2002).
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The error is natural enough: landowners frequently attack regulations as soon as they are imposed. The courts tell them that they cannot do so until they've applied for a permit and have had it denied.
The natural, unthinking assumption is that a permit must be denied
before any takings claim is ripe. In reality, the granted permit marks
the end of a temporary ban of some or all land use and thus ripens a
temporary takings claim, distinct from a claim against the regulation
as a whole.
A.

Riverside Bayview

Those decisions that do see a denied permit as a formal rule of
ripeness almost all trace back to dicta in United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc.10 5 Riverside Bayview attempted to answer a question of statutory interpretation, namely "whether the Clean Water
Act ...authorizes the [Army] Corps [of Engineers] to require landowners to obtain permits from the Corps before discharging fill material into wetlands." 10 6 The Sixth Circuit, among other arguments, had
asserted that the possibility of a taking argued for a narrow interpretation of the Clean Water Act.' 0 7 The Supreme Court disagreed on numerous grounds, and partway through its discussion the Court added
one ground that has occasioned much misunderstanding. It commented that
[a] requirement that a person obtain a permit before engaging in a
certain use of his or her property does not itself "take" the property
in any sense: after all, the very existence of a permit system implies
that permission may be granted, leaving the landowner free to use
the property as desired. Only when a permit is denied and the effect of the denial is to prevent "economically viable" use of the land
in question can it be said that a taking has occurred.10 8
Some courts have used the language "only when a permit is denied... can it be said that a taking has occurred" as if it made ripe105 474 U.S. 121, 123 (1985). Courts following Riverside Bayview tend to read the
ripeness as rule of decision idea into other Supreme Court cases, notably into Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981), and Williamson
County RegionalPlanning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank ofJohnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
See, e.g., Boise Cascade v. United States, 296 F.3d 1339, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002), discussed
infra Part VI.C. However, Hodel and Williamson County clearly stand for an uncontroversial proposition: a landowner cannot challenge a regulation without applying
for a permit. They do not support the idea that if a permit is granted, all takings
claims vanish. See supra Part III.B.
106 Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 123.
107 Id. at 125.
108 Id. at 127.
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ness into a rule of decision rather than of a way of giving contour to
claims. Those courts ignore the reality that at the time the statement
was made a very different takings universe obtained, such that Riverside Bayview's statement was an accurate account of the non-formal
application of ripeness. In 1980, before FirstEnglish and Lucas, it was
not yet clear that a less than total use ban could ever be a taking,
especially if only temporary. Riverside Bayview relied on a sincesuperseded Agins v. Tiburon analysis, under which land use regulations
only "took" if they "denie [d] an owner economically viable use of his
land."'109 Until Lucas, however, it was not yet clear whether this meant
that there was only a taking in the rare case of a complete loss of use,
or whether it only meant that a complete loss of use would always be a
taking. If the former, then even the worst permit requirement, imposing a long delay and enormous trouble, will still leave room for some
economically viable use of the land, because "the very existence of a
permit system implies that permission may be granted, leaving the
landowner free to use property as desired."' 10 Thus, in the time when
Agins v. Tiburon was still a bright star in the regulatory takings universe, the Riverside Bayview language was arguably correct.1 1 1 Since
then, the Penn Central test has clearly expanded to include non-total
use bans;1 12 total loss of economically viable use is not necessary, and
permit requirements are no longer noncompensable merely because
some use might be left at the end of the process.
Not only partial regulations generally but temporary takings specifically seemed an oxymoron at the time of Riverside Bayview. The
Court noted that "[w]e have not yet resolved the question whether

compensation is a constitutionally mandated remedy for 'temporary
regulatory takings.'

'' 113

In 1987, FirstEnglish removed that particular

doubt-temporary takings now warranted the Penn Centraltest. Thus,
if Riverside Bayview did prohibit, per se, compensation for permit requirements and other planning delays, it did so because at that time
there was no regulatory takings claim, and a takings claim could not
109 Id. at 126 (citing Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)); see also supra
notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
110 Id.at 127.
111 Those few cases that refer to a Riverside Bayview style rule (i.e., a granted permit
means no takings claim) without citing Riverside Bayview are from the era of Agins v.
Tiburon. See, e.g.,
United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204, 1211 (2d Cir. 1979).
112 To give one example, Lucas v.South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003
(1992), held that denying an owner economically viable use of land is a categorical
taking. The Court explained that this is the proposition that it meant to advance in
Agins v. Tiburon. Id. at 1016. As the Penn Central test is not categorical, obviously
something less than total deprivation can still be a taking.
113 Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 129 n.6.
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therefore ripen, until an agency had imposed a permanent use restriction. In any case, other evidence from the opinion suggests that the
Court did not intend to erect .,uch a rule.
Riverside Bayview probably did not intend to state a rule barring
permits from being takings. First, the Riverside Bayview landowners
had simply not applied for a permit and then subsequently found
themselves caught in a lengthy, costly process that called for redress.
In fact, they had not even applied for the permit at all. Thus, even in
a post-Agins era, the landowners would not have had a ripe claim. As
this Note argues, permit requirements are only takings claims when
the landowner has applied for a permit and has received a final decision, because only then can the delay and burden of applying for a
permit be known. Thus, the ruling and the facts of Riverside Bayview
are compatible with permit requirements as potential takings, even if
this particular language is not.
Furthermore, this particular language is dicta, that is, "statements
in a judicial opinion that are not necessary to support the decision
reached by the court." 114 Riverside Bayview, after all, is a case about
statutory interpretation and not a case about regulatory takings. The
Court's real reasoning is that only per se takings need influence statutory interpretation; as long as permit requirements are not per se regulatory takings it makes little difference to Riverside Bayview's analysis
whether permit requirements are never takings (as the language
quoted above would tend to suggest) or merely possible takings
weighed under Penn Central (as later language in the same opinion
suggests). The Court makes this clear: "If neither the imposition of
the permit requirement itself nor the denial of a permit necessarily
constitute a taking, it follows that the Court of Appeals erred."1 5 In
other words, the result in Riverside Bayview is not logically tied to the
view that permit requirements are never takings. The result is only
tied to the view that permit requirements are not always takings,
which is precisely the result that evaluating permits under an ad hoc
test will generate.
The Riverside Bayview Court reiterated this same point later in the
opinion. "[The Sixth Circuit's approach] is sensible where it appears
that there is an identifiable class of cases in which application of a
statute will necessarily constitute a taking ....

this is not such a case:

there is no identifiable set of instances in which mere application of
the permit requirement will necessarily or even probably constitute a
114

Michael C. Doff, Dicta and Article IIl, 142 U.

115

Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 129 n.6 (emphasis added).

PA.

L. REv. 1997, 2000 (1994).
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taking." 1 6 But under the Penn Central test, permit requirements
clearly do not necessarily or even probably constitute a taking. Thus,
Riverside Bayview is consistent with permits as potential takings, especially when one considers that the takings discussion is incidental to
the global issue and did not occupy the attention of the Court.1 17 The
so-called Riverside Bayview rule, which implies that permits are never
takings, comes from dicta. 118 In the takings arena, Riverside Bayview
thus stands for two uncontroversial propositions: first, that permits are
not ripe takings until a final decision and, second, permits are not
takings per se.
B. Lower Court Cases
A number of lower court cases have seized on the language that

"only when a permit is denied . . . can it be said that a taking has

occurred." 119 They treat this language as if it created a substantive
rule that a takings claim could never be ripe if it involved a granted
permit. Given this rule's dubious origin in Riverside Bayview, it is little
wonder that cases relying on it have not been models of clarity in all
respects. Nonetheless, these cases generally seem to fall into two classes. First are those in which a landowner has suffered a delay because
of a permit requirement or some other planning device-the courts
cite Riverside Bayview and dismiss the claim as perpetually unripe. Second, plaintiffs who have not filed for a permit claim that the permit
requirement effects a taking. In these cases, the courts rightly find
that the takings claim is unripe, although citing the same overbroad
language that Riverside Bayview used.
Cases of the second class are by far the more frequent, though
1 20
some are murky enough that they may belong in the first class.
116 Id. at 129 n.5 (emphasis added).
117 Riverside Bayview is cited just as much for its ruling on how potential takings
should influence statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Iowa Utilities Bd. v. F.C.C., 219
F.3d 744, 754 (2000).
118 This Note will not scrupulously insert a "so-called" when referring to the Riverside Bayview rule. Lack thereof should not be taken to indicate that the author has
changed his mind.
119 Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 127.
120 See, e.g., Adams v. United States, 255 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 2001) (requiring a
landowner to seek a permit or special use authorization did not effect a taking where
the landowner had not applied for the permit); Greenbrier v.United States 193 F.3d
1348, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting that, when beneficiaries of certain federal mort-

gage programs were not allowed to prepay without seeking authorization, the takings
claim was not ripe until the beneficiaries had actually tried to seek the authorization);
Howard W. Heck & Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 134 F.3d 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(holding that a regulation was not a taking where the landowner failed to complete
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Cases of the first class, though less numerous, are still fairly frequent.
One example will suffice to show the defects of this class: the Federal
Circuit's attempt to follow the so-called rule of Riverside Bayview in
Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States.1'2 When the United States Army
Corps of Engineers had mistakenly enjoined Tabb Lakes from developing a property, for a period of three years, Tabb Lakes countered
with a temporary takings claim. The Court of Federal Claims gave
summary judgment to the Army Corps of Engineers and the Court of
Appeals upheld, noting that the three year injunction could not be a
taking, as Tabb Lakes could have applied for permission to develop
and, if that permission had been granted, they would have had no
claim. 12 2 The court mistakenly relied on Riverside Bayview as support
for this proposition: "As a matter of law, the possibility of a permit
precludes the order itself from constituting a taking."1 2 3 Tabb Lakes
also referred to the Agins principle that "preliminary decisionmaking
does not amount to a taking."' 12 4 In the normal sense, the takings
the permit process); Gilbert v. City of Cambridge, 932 F.2d 51, 56 (1st Cir. 1991)
(holding a takings claim unripe because the landowners had neither applied for a
permit nor used a state inverse condemnation procedure); Rybachek v. United States
Envtl. Prot. Agency, 904 F.2d 1276, 1300 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that a takings claim
against a permit requirement was not ripe because the affected Alaskan placer miners
had not shown effects on any particular property); United States v. Vogler, 859 F.2d
638, 642 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that a regulation imposing a permit requirement is
not a taking where the landowner steadfastly refuses to apply for a permit); United
States v. Rivera Torres, 826 F.2d 151 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that designation as a
wetland was not a taking when the landowner could apply for a permit that would
permit use but had failed to do so); United States v. Moseley, 761 F. Supp. 90 (E.D.
Mo. 1991) (holding that an assertion of jurisdiction was not a taking because the
landowners had not finished the permit process); Lakewood Assocs. v. United States,
45 Fed. Cl. 320, 332 (1999) (holding that a claim was unripe because the owner had
prematurely abandoned attempts to get a permit); Conant v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct.
689, (1987) (rejecting a landowner's taking claim because he failed to file for a
permit).
121 10 F.3d 796 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Other cases in this class include Wyatt v. United
States, 271 F.3d 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that a ten year permit delay was not a
taking; permit requirements are not takings unless the government needlessly delays
acting); and Dufau v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 156 (1990) (holding that a mere permit
requirement cannot be a taking unless it causes extraordinary delay and involves total
loss of use). In a similar case, the landowners in Robbins v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl.
381 (1998), had not filed for a permit-they challenged the mere designation of their
land as wetland-but were able to show a specific property loss as a result of the
designation. Although the contours of the claim were known, the court persisted in
finding that their claim was not ripe, citing Riverside Bayview as authority. Id. at 385.
122 Tabb Lakes, 10 F.3d at 800-01.
123 Id. at 801.
124 Id.
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claim was ripe, as the agency was not in a position to take back or alter
the three year ban. Tabb Lakes nevertheless held the claim unripe because it had ended without a formal process of permit-seeking and
permit denial.
Tabb Lakes was flawed in another way. The Federal Circuit erred
because it thought a delay (such as a permit requirement) of any
length of time would automatically be a compensable taking if it were
potentially a taking at all: "[To decide if there was a taking] we must
give the same effect to the cease and desist order regardless of
whether the order ultimately had a permanent effect or only one limited in time.'

25

But under current jurisprudence, temporary takings

would be analyzed under Penn Central,in which the outcome would be
doubtful, whereas a permanent ban would automatically constitute a
compensable taking under Lucas. The distinction matters, and Tabb
Lakes is representative of how making a rule of Riverside Bayview has
tended to corrupt other doctrines of regulatory takings.
Besides its dubious antecedents and rationality, the rule has also
proved impractical to apply, and courts have had to modify it. Two of
the leading Federal Circuit cases, Tabb Lakes and Wyatt, both chose to
create an exception for "extraordinary delay,"' 2 6 in an ungainly attempt to approximate at least some of the flexibility of Penn Central
analysis. But this "extraordinary delay" proved a weak reed. In Wyatt,
a ten year delay was not considered "extraordinary" because the underlying regulatory scheme was very complex; 127 in other words, long
delays were ordinary under that particular scheme of regulation. In
contrast, Penn Centralanalysis would have allowed the court to directly
consider whether the burden of highly complex regulations may have
been better borne by the general public. The so-called Riverside
Bayview rule has proved unable to provide a measure of relief to those
landowners in the toils of regulation.
The Riverside Bayview rule is an out-of-context misreading of superseded dicta. It has proved unworkable in practice. The web of the
law is better for having Tahoe-Sierra threaded into it, and the Riverside
Bayview rule threaded out.

125 Id. at 800.
126 Id. at 803; see also Wyatt, 271 F.3d at 1098. Wyatt indicated that proof of "extraordinary delay" would almost always be proof of bad faith. Wyatt, 271 F.3d at 1098.
127 Wyatt, 271 F.3d at 1097-99.
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TAHOE-SIERRA

Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 128 the Supreme Court's 2002 regulatory takings case, has ended any remaining doubt about permits as potential takings and
should put to rest the formal ripeness rule that excludes them.
The case was primarily an attempt to test some of the more radical implications of Lucas. Lucas affirmed that a total and permanent
ban on the use of a property was per se or categorically a taking. But
how to define property? The Supreme Court had heretofore used the
"whole parcel" rule, which includes all the uses of all of the portions
of a plot, along with all the future uses. Lucas, however, suggested
that property might mean "interests in land" or "estates" that had a
"rich tradition of protection at common law."'129 As terms of years,
leaseholds, and other temporary but otherwise complete ownership
interests do indeed have a long tradition at the common law, some
speculated that total but temporary prohibitions on all use were also
per se takings under Lucas. Tahoe-Sierra tested that possibility. As the
temporary delay at issue was a moratorium on construction-a common planning device-the Supreme Court had an opportunity to
clarify the proper rule for other planning devices, like permits, that
also cause temporary delays.
A.

Legal and FactualBackground

Tahoe-Sierra addressed a dispute between numerous landowners
(the Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council) and the Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency. Dedicated to conserving the legendary clarity of
Lake Tahoe's waters, the agency had imposed a temporary moratorium on further development and then indefinitely renewed the moratorium. 30 The landowners took to the courts and claimed that they
had suffered a taking for the duration of the combined moratoria (a
period of some three years).13I The district court applied two different takings tests: the categorical takings rule announced in Lucas, and
the ad hoc test usually associated with Penn Central. The district court
ruled that a total prohibition of development for a period of time
128 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
129 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992).
130 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 306-08.
131 Although the moratoria only deprived the landowners of three years' use, injunctions, delays, and the permit process imposed after the moratoria have prevented
some uses up to this day. See Michael Berger, Tahoe-Sierra, Much Ado About-What? 25
U. HAW. L. REv. 295, 296-300 (2003).
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brought the landowners' claim under the sheltering wing of Lucas. 132
But if not for Lucas, they would have been out of luck: the district
court ruled that the Penn Central factors would have resulted in the
33
opposite decision.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overruled, the judges
of that court correctly reasoning that the Supreme Court and lower
courts have indicated that most regulatory takings cases should be resolved by the Penn Central test balancing the public and private interests at stake, with three primary factors weighing in the balance: (1)
the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; (2) the extent
to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
34
expectations; and (3) the character of the governmental action.
But the Ninth Circuit saw that the district court had disposed of
Centralclaim, so it turned it's attention to the Lucas claim,1 35
Penn
the
which it rejected because the moratorium only took all present use of
the land, holding out hope for the future. 136 That is, the moratorium
did not take all uses because the future uses were left. The Ninth
Circuit even (incorrectly, as it turns out) went so far as to suggest that
moratoria and permit requirements might categorically never be takings by noting that the Supreme Court's discussion of planning in
FirstEnglish "suggests that planning activities that temporarily prohibit
development do not constitute takings." 13 7 In any case, the Ninth Circuit deferred to the lower court judgment that the three year moratoria were not regulatory taking under the Penn Central test.13 8
B.

Ruling

The Supreme Court granted certiorari, the Justices in the majority viewing the issues as whether a "moratorium on development...
constitutes a per se taking of property."' 139 The Court held that it did
not. 140 Like the district court and the court of appeals, the Supreme
132

Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,

34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1242-43 (D. Nev. 1999) (citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)).
133 Id. at 1240-42.
134 Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
216 F.3d 764, 772 (9th Cir. 2000).
135 Id. at 773.
136 Id. at 782.
137 Id. at 778 n.17.
138 Id. at 782.
139 Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
535 U.S. 302, 306 ( 2002).
140 Id. at 321.
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Court distinguished two takings regimes: a per se regime, such as that
14 1
found in Lucas, and an ad hoc regime, described in Penn Central.
The Court concluded that moratoria were not takings per se but rejected the argument mentioned by the Ninth Circuit

42

and by the

respondent 143

that moratoria, permit requirements, and other land
use regulations in aid of government decisionmaking never were takings. "Inour view the answer to the abstract question whether a temporary moratorium effects a taking is neither 'yes, always' nor 'no,
never."' 144 The Court resisted "[t]he temptation to adopt what
amount to per se rules in either direction." 14 5 Instead, the Supreme
Court thought that the moratoria would best be adjudicated by "relying on the familiar Penn Central approach.' 1 46 The Court was fully
aware that using a Penn Central approach implied that some planning
moratoria would require compensation. "It may be true," the Court
admitted, "that under a Penn Central analysis petitioners' land was
taken and compensation would be due."'1 4 7 Of course, the district

court had already applied the Penn Central analysis, and the petitioners had failed to appeal, relieving the Supreme Court of any further
need to consider a possible Penn Central taking. But the ruling remained: moratoria are or are not takings based on the unique facts of
each case as filtered through the Penn Central factors. Or, as the Supreme Court would have it: "We conclude, therefore, that the interest
in 'fairness and justice' will be best served by relying on the familiar
Penn Central approach when deciding cases like this." 148 Moratoria
always present a takings claim, but will have to be evaluated using the
Penn Centralfactors to decide whether they are actually takings or not.
So the Supreme Court put (potential) fear and trembling into
moratoriators everywhere. It also served notice that permit requirements and other planning delays could be takings. The Court in
Tahoe-Sierra reached its result by equating moratoria with permit and
other planning delays, and then applying to moratoria the rule that to
the Court seemed appropriate for permit requirements. In other
words, Tahoe-Sierraruled that moratoria should be considered under a
Penn Centralanalysis because moratoria are like permit requirements,
and permit requirements are to be evaluated under a Penn Central test.
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148

Id. at 321-25.
See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 321.
Id.
Id. at 342.
Id. at 321 n.16.
Id. at 342.
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The Court rejected a per se rule for moratoria explicitly because
any such rule would necessarily become a per se rule for permits or
other devices. " [T] he extreme categorical rule that any deprivation of
all economic use, no matter how brief, constitutes a compensable taking surely cannot be sustained. Petitioners' broad submission would
apply to numerous 'normal delays in obtaining building permits,
changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like.' "149 Moratoria
cannot always be takings because then most permit requirements
would automatically be takings. Moratoria and permit requirements
are conflated. Moratoria are just another planning tool.
Perhaps recognizing the similarity between permits and moratoria, the petitioners (the landowners) used both their brief and oral
arguments to try to distinguish them. In their brief, they argued that
First English distinguished between permit requirements and moratoria. First English made this distinction, they argued, because permits,
variances, and other devices are all "a process in which a landowner is
participating with the expectation-or at least the possibility-of obtaining development permission at the conclusion." 150 In contrast,
the petitioners argued, moratoria are "total development
freeze[s]."

151

The petitioners tried to make the same distinction, at

rather more length, in oral arguments. They told the court that a
permit requirement "is a process leading toward development. [A
moratorium] is a process of total blockage." 15 2 The Court found this
distinction difficult, so the petitioners ended up spending the bulk of
153
their oral argument time trying to explain.
149 Id. at 334-35 (citing First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v.
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987)).
150 Petitioner's Brief at 28, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 ( 2002) (No. 00-1167).
151 Id.
152 Michael Berger, Oral Argument, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) (No. 00-1167).
153 Id. The following exchange is typical:
QUESTION: What do you do about the fact that there is a regulatory taking
of sorts whenever you have a permit system, let's say the normal zoning regime in which you cannot construct any building on your acreage without
first applying and getting the approval of the zoning agency?
MR. BERGER: Justice ScaliaQUESTION: During that period, there's been a total taking. You cannot do
anything with that property until you get the building approved.
MR. BERGER: Clearly you cannot do anything until you've gotten the property approved, but it seems to me that there is a fundamental difference
between a landowner working through a system whose end product is, at
least theoretically and probably very likely, the issuance of a permit to go
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Perhaps because of the petitioners' urging, Tahoe-Sierra did
briefly entertain the idea of treating moratoria and permits differently. The Court "could craft a narrower rule that would cover all
temporary land-use restrictions except those 'normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances,
and the like,'

15 4

but in rejecting this "narrower rule," the Supreme

Court clearly conflates permit delay with moratoria. The "petitioners
fail to offer a persuasive explanation for why moratoria should be
treated differently from ordinary permit delays .... [P]etitioners' ar155
gument breaks down under closer examination."'
In Tahoe-Sierra, the Court ends any remaining uncertainty about
permits as potential takings. The Court first concluded that moratoria
delays are indistinguishable from the delays attendant on seeking a
permit, a variance, or other planning device. It then stated that Penn
Central is the correct takings regime for permit delays. Since permits
were equivalent to moratoria, the Court then held that moratoria are
also to be treated under a Penn Central analysis. Regulatory delays,
whether moratoria or a request for a variance or a permit process, are
to be evaluated as possible takings under a fact-specific, ad hoc test.
As if to remove any remaining doubt, Tahoe-Sierra was careful to
refer to "ordinary permit delays"1 5 6 as potential takings in contrast to
Tabb Lakes's and Wyatt's "extraordinary delays." Tahoe-Sierra puts to
rest any notion that permits cannot be takings, and any remaining
misconception of Riverside Bayview.
C. Post-Tahoe-Sierra: Boise Cascade
One Federal Circuit case has attempted to defend the so-called
Riverside Bayview rule against Tahoe-Sierra.157 The paltry defense only
serves to underscore the vigor of Tahoe-Sierra'sinclusion of permits.
Boise Cascade Corporation owned a 65-acre wood, which they
wished to log. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service wished to use that
wood for another purpose-breeding habitat for spotting owls. After
ahead and develop something that is economically productive on that land
as opposed to being stuck in a system where you're forbiddenQUESTION: But that would have been during that interval of time it meets
your test. Nothing can be done until the permit issues, so a fortiori, under
your theory, compensation due.
MR. BERGER: I don't believe so, Justice O'Connor, becauseQUESTION: Well, that's what it sounds like.
154 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 333.
155 Id. at 338 n.31.
156 Id.
157 Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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three years of permit applications, injunctions, and counterclaims (lucrative, no doubt, for some legal practitioner), the resident spotted
owl took matters into its own hands and died. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service promptly released Boise Cascade from any obligation to
get a permit before logging, and, a three year takings claim now being
ripe, Boise Cascade promptly sued, "seeking just compensation for the
'temporary taking of merchantable timber, which it was prevented
from logging."'158 The government countered that a three year delay,
if caused by a permit requirement, "did not constitute a taking as a
159
matter of law under United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc."
The Federal Circuit accepted this theory, and in so doing rejected
Tahoe-Sierra's rule.
The Boise Cascade court attempted to explain away Tahoe-Sierraon
two grounds: first, that permit requirements are not really like moratoria; 160 and second, that the Supreme Court would not eliminate an
important doctrine like that of ripeness as rule of decision without
explicitly mentioning the doctrine.16 1 The first ground is directly contradicted by Tahoe-Sierra itself. The second ground rests on false
assumptions.
Boise Cascade does not succeed in trying to undo Tahoe-Sierra's
conflation of moratoria and other planning delays. The appellate
court admitted that "[t]he [Supreme] Court explicitly analogized the
temporary moratoria ... to permitting delay cases."' 162 The court also
admitted that Tahoe-Sierra's footnote 31 establishes that "temporary
moratoria should be treated like permitting delay[s].

"163

But it adds,

"This does not affect that longstanding rule that ... only extraordinary
delays in the permitting process ripen into a compensable taking.
Whether a particular extraordinary delay constitutes a taking is governed by Penn Central,just as are temporary moratoria."'164 Boise Cascade tried to recast Tahoe-Sierra as equating moratoria and
extraordinary permit delays, but Tahoe-Sierra actually says "moratoria
165
should be treated [like] ordinary permit delays."
While admitting that the Supreme Court "explicitly analogized
the temporary moratoria at issue in Tahoe to permitting delay
158 Id. at 1342.
159 Id. at 1343.
160 Id. at 1350-51.
161 Id. at 1351.
162 Id. at 1350.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 1352 (emphasis added).
165 Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
535 U.S. 302, 338 (2002).
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cases,"' 166 the Federal Circuit thought a difference could still be
found-moratoria are not like permit requirements because "the
moratoria admit[ted] no exceptions, whereas permits can be granted
and variances allowed."' 16 7 The Tahoe-Sierra landowners made the
same argument: they repeatedly urged the Court to distinguish permit
requirements on the grounds that permit requirements envision
granted permits, whereas moratoria do not. 168 Tahoe-Sierra'sreply devastated the landowners and devastates Boise Cascade. "[P]etitioners'
argument breaks down under closer examination because there is no
guarantee that a permit will be granted, or that a decision will be
made .... [Moreover, an agency might] simply delay[ ] action on all
permits. ' 169 In other words, as long as a permit is still pending, the
regulation puts a chokehold on land use just as a moratorium would.
If a permit is granted in two years, a two year "moratorium" has just
been lifted. If the permit is denied after two years, a two year "moratorium" has just been made permanent. Permit delays and moratoria
conflate, which is why Tahoe-Sierraexplicitly and repeatedly analogized
"ordinary permit delays" to moratoria for the purposes of takings analysis. The absurdity-the near lawlessness even-of Boise Cascade's attempt to explain away Tahoe-Sierra shows how fully and completely
Tahoe-Sierra addressed permit requirements.
The Federal Circuit also argued that the Court would not overturn an important rule like the Riverside Bayview rule without so stating explicitly, let alone doing it with a few throwaway lines. "Tahoe,"
the Federal Circuit argued, "did not explicitly overrule, or even dis166 Boise Cascade, 296 F.3d at 1350.
167 Id. at 1352.
168 See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text. The following exchange from
oral argument highlights the identical content of Boise Cascade's and the petitioners'
argument:
QUESTION: But you still have-I mean, in the one case the regulating
agency has said, you can't do anything with your land while we're thinking
about the scheme we're going to adopt, and in the other case the agency has
said, just as categorically, you can't do anything with your land while we consider your application. In both cases they're, for a later regulatory purpose
they're both saying, you can't do anything with your land.
MR. BERGER: Justice Scalia, in a sense that is certainly true, but in the case
of the processing of a permit application, we know that there is permitted
use. It's there. It's in the books.
QUESTION: Not during the pendency. Not while the application is
pending.
Michael Berger, Oral Argument, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) (No. 00-1167).
169 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 338.
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cuss, the ripeness rule articulated in Riverside Bayview."' 70 The Federal
Circuit continued, "Boise argues, in essence, that the Court overruled
1 71
Riverside Bayview sub silentio in footnote 31 of its opinion in Tahoe."
But this simply will not do. Tahoe-Sierra did not merely mention permit delays in one obscure footnote-the comparison permeates the
case. It provides the grounds for the decision. 172 Furthermore, TahoeSierra overturned nothing. Ripeness has always been about discovering the contours of a claim and nothing more. 173 The Riverside
Bayview rule came not from the case but from a lower court
174
misreading.
Finally, the Tahoe-SierraCourt had before it a correct understanding of Riverside Bayview. 175 That nuanced view, propounded by both
the respondent and by the Solicitor General's amicus brief, sees Riverside Bayview as merely standing for the proposition that a permit does
not effect a categorical taking. The Solicitor General's brief, for instance, brings in Riverside Bayview because it holds that "a temporary
bar on development for the duration of the permitting process leaves
open the potential for future productive uses and is therefore exceedingly unlikely to eliminate the property's value, even on a temporary
basis."' 176 Elimination of property value is, of course, a key component
of the Lucas categorical test. The Solicitor General is merely (and
correctly) suggesting that Riverside Bayview does not classify permit requirements as categorical takings.
Likewise, the Tahoe-Sierra respondent used Riverside Bayview to
make an uncontroversial point about the requirements of ripeness.
Its brief cited Riverside Bayview to support the proposition that "[u] ntil
the planning process is complete, and the range of future uses established, it cannot be said that an agency has opted to prohibit all use of
affected properties."1 77 These more nuanced views accurately portray
the whole of the Riverside Bayview opinion. As the Court had these
more nuanced and correct views available to it, it should in no way
have felt obligated to "overturn" Riverside Bayview.
170 Boise Cascade,296 F.3d at 1351.
171 Id.
172 See supra Part VI.B.
173 See supra Part VI.B.
174 See supra Part V.A.
175 This understanding is described supra Part V.A.
176 Amicus Curia Brief for the United States at 13, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) (No. 00-1167).
177 Respondent's Brief at 26-27, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) (No. 00-1167) (citing United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126 (1985)).
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Further, the Tahoe-Sierra Court was fully aware of the so-called
Riverside Bayview rule. In another section of the brief, the respondent
tried to argue that permit requirements and moratoria are categorically never takings. The respondent referred to the
Court's determination in Riverside Bayview Homes ...

that the re-

quirement that a property owner obtain a permit "before engaging
in a certain use of his or her property does not itself 'take' the property in any sense." Implicit in such a finding, of course, is the premise that the process necessary to obtain a permit does not itself
178
result in a taking.

When the Tahoe-SierraCourt stated that permits were potential takings
under Penn Central, it was not unaware of the argument allegedly in
Riverside Bayview that permits could never be takings. A court cannot
legitimately claim that the Tahoe-Sierra treatment of permit requirements and other planning regulations is illegitimate because TahoeSierrawas unaware of an alternative interpretation of Riverside Bayview.
We have already seen that Riverside Bayview does not contradict
Tahoe-Sierra's clear holding that permitting requirements can be takings. The respondent's and amicus' briefs made this clear to the
Court. But if there was any contradiction between Tahoe-Sierra and
some interpretations of Riverside Bayview, we cannot say that the Supreme Court was ignorant of the consequences of their ruling. The
respondent forthrightly referred to Riverside Bayview as a categorical
rule against permit requirements as takings. If the respondent's (and
Boise-Cascade's) theory of Riverside Bayview is correct, Tahoe-Sierra has
overruled it.
Boise-Cascade's attempt to salvage its interpretation of Riverside
Bayview failed. Moratoria cannot be distinguished from permit requirements; permit requirements cannot be distinguished from other
regulatory takings. Tahoe-Sierra has ended the ripeness misunderstanding that led some lower courts to try to do so.
CONCLUSION

Tahoe-Sierra has taken a decisive step in a long line of development. Permit requirements and other planning delays are clearly now
potential takings under Penn Central,just like any other land use regulation. While many of these claims will not prevail-most permit requirements do not in fact impose an onerous burden-landowners
now have a measure of relief from the enormous power of the regula178 Respondent's Brief at 33-34, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) (No. 00-1167).
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tors that grant the permits. If nothing else, a landowner can always
take to the courts seeking compensation for whatever delay has already happened, thus imposing the stick of a lawsuit on the recalcitrant regulators who are in turn imposing costs on the landowner.
Although Tahoe-Sierra has taken a major step, some things yet
need to be done. The Supreme Court will probably have to reaffirm
Tahoe-Sierra before the Federal Circuit and other lower courts will finally agree that it means what it says. More interesting, the Supreme
Court will have to develop a doctrine of comparative fault, to apportion permit delays between the permit regulation and the landowner.
The courts will have to ask what proportion of the temporary loss of
use was inherent in the permit regulation and agency consideration,
and what was due to the landowner's unreasonable dilatoriness in applying or responding to requests. The Supreme Court will also need
to develop a doctrine of joint and several liability. In a world of overlapping regulations, only thus can governments fairly share the costs
between them. Only in this way can the courts prevent agencies from
cooperating to tie up permits.
In these ways, the journey that Tahoe-Sierra has so helped along
will be well ended. Those caught in the toils will have a measure of
relief.

